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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by Order of the Utah Supreme Court 
dated October 30,2001 (R. 750) and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(J) and 78-
2-2(4) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
The issue presented for this court to determine is whether the trial court's decision 
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the basis that the 
remaining claims for damages were solely for attorney fees and punitive damages, which 
are not recoverable under the Utah fraudulent transfer statute or any exceptions thereto, 
and therefore Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). In reviewing a grant for summary judgment, the 
facts are analyzed, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). The 
trial court's decision presents a question of law. Therefore, no deference is accorded to 
the trial court and the decision is reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
II 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Determination of this appeal requires analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1, et seq., 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1)(a). These sections are set forth in full in the 
accompanying addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris") brought this present action ("Macris IF9) 
against Neways, Inc., Thomas E. Mower and Leslie D. Mower ("Defendants" or 
"Appellees") in anticipation of obtaining a judgment in an earlier action captioned Macris 
& Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitudes, Inc. and Thomas Mower, Civil No. 910400358 
("Maoris F). (R. 613). The three claims in Macris II allege Fraudulent Transfer,
 ( 
Successor Liability and Alter-Ego Liability. (R. 599, 593 and 591, respectively). In 
addition to pursuing a means to insure recovery of the anticipated judgment, Appellant 
sought further contract damages in Macris II against Appellees for the claims asserted in 
Macris I. (R. 590). 
Course of Proceeding 
On April 17,1991, Macris filed an action in the Fourth District Court against 
Images and Attitude, Inc. ("Images") claiming that Images breached a contract with
 { 
Macris. This was the Macris I action. 
Subsequent to the filing of Macris I and prior to trial in Macris I, Images 
i 
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transferred certain assets to Neways, Inc. 
Macris /went to trial beginning February 16,1995 and continuing into March, 
1995, and a judgment in favor of Macris and against Images was rendered September 
15,1995. (R. 587). 
On or about February 14,1995, two days before the Macris /trial, Macris prepared 
and filed the Macris II action, asserting that the formation of Neways, Inc. and the 
associated transfer of certain assets to Neways, Inc. from Images, had left Images without 
sufficient assets to cover the anticipated judgment in Macris I. (R. 12). 
On October 19,1995, Appellees moved in Macris II for summary judgment, 
contending that the Macris claims were barred by res judicata. (R. 229), The trial court 
granted the summary judgment motion holding that res judicata barred Macris from 
recovering further contract damages on its theories of fraudulent conveyance, alter-ego 
liability and successor liability. (R. 467). 
Macris appealed the trial court's ruling. (R. 490). The Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. (R. 527). 
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to Appellees, and on December 5, 
2000, ruled in Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93 (Utah 2000) that 
the issue preclusion branch of the doctrine of res judicata precluded Macris from seeking 
further contract damages in Macris II and that the remaining theories of fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability and alter-ego liability remained for adjudication by the trial 
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court. (R. 567). 
Subsequent to the Utah Supreme Court's decision, and prior to the filing of 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 16, 2001 the judgement in 
Macris 1 was caused to be satisfied in whole. (R. 628). 
On May 10,2001, the Fourth District Court, Hon. Anthony W. Schofield 
presiding, heard Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment which asserted that the 
satisfaction of the Macris /judgment removed any and all possible recovery of damages 
on the remaining theories of liability, and therefore Macris //was "moot", since the 
judgment in Macris I had been satisfied in full with interest and the Utah Supreme Court 
had barred any further claims for contract damages. (R. 626, 650 and 680). 
Disposition in the Trial Court. 
On July 18,2001, the trial court issued its Memorandum of Ruling. (R.734). In 
that ruling the trial court correctly held that the Utah fraudulent conveyance statute in 
conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (l)(a) does not provide for attorneys fees and 
punitive damages, and that the "third-party litigation exception" was inapplicable to the 
present case, and therefore, Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. On August 2,2001, an Order reflecting the trial court's ruling was entered granting 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees. (R.745). 
Statement of Facts, 
For purposes of this Court's review of the correctness of the trial court's decision, 
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Appellees hereby set forth the relevant undisputed material facts as stated within their 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as filed with the trial court. (R. 626-622). It is important to note that Macris 
conceded that there was no dispute as to the material facts set forth in Appellee's moving 
papers. (R. 741, R. 649). (The relevant facts re-stated herein from the Appellees 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment have been modified only to the extent 
that the parties' designation properly reflect their positions on appeal, and referrals to the 
exhibits have been changed to reflect their position within the record): 
1. On or about June 9,1992, Macris filed its Second Amended Complaint 
against Images in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
alleging among other things, breach of contract. 
- • * * "
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2. On or about February 14,1995, two days before trial in Macris /, 
Appellant filed its Complaint in this matter, alleging theories of liability 
against Appellees for Fraudulent Transfer, Successor Liability, and Alter 
Ego. 
3. Trial was held in Macris I and as a result, judgment was entered against 
Images for breach of contract in the principal amount of $360,681.20. 
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4. Macris did not make a demand for satisfaction of this judgment until 
February, 2001. 
5. The instant case, Macris II, proceeded with the parties filing and arguing 
cross motions for summary judgment before the trial court, which resulted 
in a ruling from the trial court, and subsequent appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and finally the Utah Supreme Court. 
6. In its holding, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that Appellant was barred 
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from pursuing further contract 
damages in addition to the damages awarded Appellant in Macris I. The 
Utah Supreme Court also held that Appellant's fraudulent transfer, 
successor liability and alter ego theories remained for adjudication by the 
trial court. 
7. Macris II was remanded to the trial court on January 18,2001. 
8. Appellant's Complaint in Macris II alleges the following in regards to 
seeking damages for fraudulent transfer: "Upon information and belief, 
Macris & Associates alleges that Images transferred its assets, including 
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distributorships, to Neways in a wrongful and malicious attempt to avoid 
paying Macris & Associates the liabilities that it has incurred and 
would incur as a result of Macris & Associates' action against Images 
for breach of contract." (emphasis added). 
9. Appellant's Complaint in Macris II further alleges that the alleged 
fraudulent transfer was made by Images for the purpose of avoiding paying 
Plaintiff any judgment awarded by the Court in Macris I. 
10. Appellant also alleged that punitive damages were warranted "as a 
result of Neways' alleged fraudulent transfer." 
11. With regard to Appellant's successor liability cause of action, Appellant 
alleged that Defendant Neways is liable to Plaintiff for the obligations of 
Images on the contract that was the subject of Macris I. 
12. Appellant then alleged the following with regard to its successor 
liability claim: "Because Neways is the successor corporation to Images, 
Macris & Associates is entitled to have Neways held liable to Macris & 
Associates for all amounts due or to become due from Images to Macris 
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& Associates." (Emphasis added) 
13. Appellant's Complaint in Maoris II then alleges that Defendants 
Neways, Thomas E. Mower and Leslie D. Mower and Images are the alter 
egos of each other, and seeks damages against Defendants for breach of 
Plaintiffs contract with Images that was the subject ofMaoris L 
14. On or about February 1,2001, Images received the first and only 
demand from Plaintiffs counsel for satisfaction in full of the judgment 
entered against Images in favor of Plaintiff 
15. On February 16,2001, Images satisfied the judgment in full by 
delivering a cashier's check to Plaintiff s counsel in the sum of 
$746,356.97. 
These facts, in addition to the statements concerning the: Nature of the Case; 
Course of Proceedings; and, Disposition in the Trial Court, accurately reflect the relevant 
facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court correctly determined that attorney fees and punitive damages 
are not available under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq. and Utah Code 
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Ann. §78-18-1 (l)(a). 
2, The "third-party litigation exception" promoted by Appellant is inapplicable 
to the Maoris II action. 
ARGUMENTS 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 741). Furthermore, 
summary judgment is appropriate when the movant makes a showing which precludes, as 
a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the respondent. FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherby Ins. Co., 549 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). (R. 741). 
Macris concedes that there is no dispute as to the material facts asserted by 
Appellees. (R. 741). 
1. Attorney Fees Are Not Available As A Remedy Since There Is No 
Contractual Provision Or Statute Authorizing Such Fees. 
The rule in Utah is that attorney fees cannot be recovered unless provided for by 
statute or contract. Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 982,983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). There are 
two limited exceptions to this long-standing rule: insurance contracts and the "third-party 
negligence" exception. Collier at 984. 
In this case, there is no contractual relationship (of insurance or otherwise) 
between Appellant and Appellees. Similarly, the remedies provided for under the Utah 
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fraudulent transfer statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1, et seq. do not provide for 
the award of attorney fees, and there is no case law in Utah permitting attorney fees under 
the statute. In fact, there is case law in Utah which has held that attorney fees are not 
recoverable under the Utah fraudulent transfer statute. 
In Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), this 
Court stated that the plain language of the Utah fraudulent transfer act does not allow an 
award of attorney fees since they are not authorized by the statute. Id at 1264. In so 
holding, this Court reasoned that it "has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an 
intention not expressed." Id at 1264. See also, Morganroth & Morganroth v. Dehorean, 
213 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. (Utah) 2000). In analyzing the Utah fraudulent transfer statute, 
this Court further stated in the Selvage case: 
"The statute's language never specifically refers to attorney fees, but instead 
only to the amount of the creditor's claim. A claim for damages under the 
U.F.T.A. is separate and distinct from an award of attorney fees." 
Selvage at 1264. 
Hence, attorney fees are not a basis for a claim of damages, compensatory, general 
or otherwise, under the Utah fraudulent transfer statute. In fact, as this court has 
previously decided, they are not contemplated as recoverable in any manner under the 
statute. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in refusing to extend the recovery of 
attorney fees to a statutory action. 
Since the legislature and this Court have not provided for attorney fees under the 
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Utah fraudulent transfer act, Appellant is necessarily barred from obtaining them in this 
action. The trial court was correct in ruling that attorney fees are not recoverable as a 
basis for damages in this action. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
2. Punitive Damages Are Not Available As A Remedy Absent Statutory 
Authority Or The Showing Of Compensatory Or General Damages. 
Under Utah law, punitive damages should be awarded infrequently. Beck's Office 
Furniture and Supplies, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 94 F.3d 655 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1996). 
Appellant relies heavily on unproven allegations of wrongful conduct in an effort 
to persuade this Court that punitive damages should be awarded, even though no other 
damages are available and the statute does not provide such remedy. In fact, in each of 
the cases cited by Appellant in support of the argument for punitive damages where no 
other damages are present, there has first been a finding of fact of willful and malicious 
conduct by the defendant, which could be used to reason the award of punitive damages. 
Here, there are no facts determined to make such reasoning. Furthermore, there is no 
basis to pursue a trial on the facts, since the theories of liability for recovery of the 
judgment in Macris I are all lacking requisite elements to proceed to trial in Macris II. 
In essence, Appellant is seeking a remand to the trial court for a determination of 
fact where the elements of the theory of liability are not present, in the hopes of showing 
wrongful conduct that could be used to "boot strap" a remedy that is not supported by 
statute, case law or other compensatory or general damages. 
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The trial court correctly decided that punitive damages are not available. In so 
ruling, the trial court applied Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (l)(a) and properly interpreted 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq., which does not authorize the award of punitive 
damages. 
First, the pertinent part of Utah Code Ann § 78-18-1 (l)(a) provides: 
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct..." 
This language shows that the Legislature required that there must first be an award 
of compensatoiy or general damages and a finding by clear and convincing evidence that 
there was tortious conduct that was willful and malicious before punitive damages can be 
addressed. If not, there must be statutory authority for punitive damages to be awarded 
before they may be addressed. Here, there is neither. 
Furthermore, Appellant conceded to the trial court that the only "damages" sought 
were for attorney fees and punitive damages. (R. 752, p. 10, In. 5-10). This Court has 
previously determined that attorney fees are not the basis for a claim of damages under 
the Utah fraudulent transfer statute. Hence, there are no damages, compensatory, general 
or otherwise, which Appellant can rely upon in order to fall under the ambit of Utah Code 
Ann.§78-18-l(l)(a). 
Additionally, there has been no showing of the requisite conjunctive test of "clear 
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and convincing evidence" of tortious conduct that was willful and malicious. This is 
important, because due to the absence of the underlying elements which must be shown 
for Appellant to proceed under its theories of liability for enforcement of the judgment in 
Maoris /, there can be no determination of fact on any conduct of the Appellees, whether 
by a preponderance standard or the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
Finally, as stated above, the Utah fraudulent transfer statute does not provide for 
the award of punitive damages, and a broadening of remedies under the fraudulent 
transfer statute has been determined as inappropriate by this Court. See, Selvage, supra. 
Accordingly, there is no basis under the punitive damages statute or the Utah 
fraudulent transfer statute to permit an extension of punitive damages to Appellant under 
the facts and law of this case. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
3. The "Third-Party Negligence" Exception For The Recovery Of 
Attorney Fees Does Not Apply To Maoris II. 
Macris asserts that the third-party negligence exception should be extended from 
tort cases, to a case arising out of the Utah fraudulent transfer statute, even though such 
remedy is not provided by statute or case law and the extension of this unique exception 
would provide a new remedy where the underlying purpose of the Macris II action is no 
longer present - i.e. - pursuit of a means to secure recovery of the judgment in Macris I 
In making its arguments, Macris relies heavily on unsubstantiated allegations of 
wrongful conduct of the Appellees. Notwithstanding these allegations, there has been no 
finding of fact that any fraudulent conveyance occurred. The Rules of this Court and 
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prior case law of this Court establish that mere assertions are not enough to defeat 
application of the general rule that attorney fees are proper only where authorized by 
statute or contract. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), Selvage at 1265. 
It is important to remain focused on the underlying theory and purpose of the 
Macris //action, as stated before the trial court and in Appellant's pleadings, in reviewing 
this appeal. Namely, the purpose of the action was to preserve a means for recovery of 
the anticipated but unrealized judgment in Macris I against Images. (R. 752, p. 6, In. 22-
25). That judgment was in fact satisfied in whole, with interest, once a demand had been 
made for its satisfaction. For Appellant to now come before this Court to argue that it is 
entitled to attorney fees for unnecessary litigation, where such fees would have not been 
incurred had this action never been filed, is surprising at best. It appears to Appellees that 
the exhaustive pursuit of attorney fees in this matter is nothing more than an effort to 
recover further damages that should have been sought against Images in the Macris I 
matter. 
Additionally, Macris' application of the third-party exception to this case is 
flawed. The theory as articulated by the court in South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 
1279 (Utah App. 1988) for the third-party exception is as follows: 
"...when the natural consequence of one's negligence is another's involvement in a 
dispute with a third-party, attorney fees reasonably incurred in resolving the 
dispute are recoverable from the negligent party as an element of damages." 
765P.2datl282. 
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In South Sanpitch, a title company negligently failed to timely record the plaintiffs 
deed. As a result, the plaintiff was forced to file a quiet title action against a third party. 
The plaintiff sued the title company for the attorney fees incurred in maintaining the quiet 
title action. Under the "third-party tort rule", this Court allowed the recovery of those 
fees as part of the damages stemming from the title company's negligence. 
A careful reading of the South Sanpitch decision demonstrates how this theory is 
distinguishable and inapplicable to this case. First, there was a finding of liability against 
the party from whom the attorney fees were sought (this is true in all cases in which 
attorney fees have been awarded under this theory). Such is not the case here (nor can it 
be, since the underlying elements of the causes of action pursued are not present). 
Second, in South Sanpitch, the sole legal means available for plaintiff to obtain the 
remedy sought was to bring suit against the third-party land owner. Here, such is not the 
case. It is and was not necessary for Appellant to file suit against Appellees in order to 
obtain satisfaction of the judgment from Maoris I. In fact, Appellant made no effort to 
otherwise obtain satisfaction of the judgment from Maoris /until Appellant was informed 
by Appellee in Maoris //that no satisfaction efforts for the judgment had been made. 
Once Appellant made a demand for satisfaction, the judgment was satisfied. In other 
words, there were several means for satisfaction of the judgment in Maoris I other than 
through litigation. Appellant's sole means of obtaining the remedy sought in Maoris I 
were not limited to the sole option of filing a fraudulent transfer action against Appellees. 
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Accordingly, the reasoning and policy underlying the South Sanpitch decision are 
not present here. In effect, what Appellant is attempting to accomplish is the proverbial 
"second bite of the apple." Appellant is seeking the means for enlarging the recovery of 
the Maoris /judgment by extension of a rare and unique legal theory that is inapplicable 
under the law and facts of this case. 
The third and final distinction, is that in South Sanpitch there was a separate and 
distinct third-party with which litigation was necessary. Here, the alleged wrongful 
conduct used to support the argument for fees, as stated in the Complaint, is against the 
same party from whom fees are sought. 
More specifically, in South Sanpitch, the plaintiff argued that the title company 
was negligent in causing plaintiff to pursue a third party in order to obtain quiet title, and 
that is why it sought attorney fees from the title company. In other words, plaintiff ("A") 
sought fees from ("B") for its actions which resulted in a lawsuit with ("C"). Here, 
Appellant is alleging in its Complaint in Maoris //that the actions of Appellees resulted 
in the lawsuit to preserve the right to enforce an anticipated judgment which caused 
Appellant to incur attorneys fees in the action against Appellees. In other words, "A" 
seeks fees from "B" for "B's" actions which resulted in a lawsuit with "B". 
The third-party exception is not applicable here, because there is no third-party. 
The South Sanpitch case was also discussed in Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 
854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993), where the Utah Supreme Court held: 
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"The rule only applies to the recovery of fees incurred in resolving third-
party disputes caused by a defendant's negligence. It does not apply to fees 
incurred in recovering damages from that defendant." 
Broadwater at 535. 
In this case, Appellant is seeking to accomplish specifically what the Utah 
Supreme Court has prohibited - i.e. - the recovery of fees incurred in recovering damages 
from Images in Maoris I. 
Similarly, Appellants' citation to Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Company, 
Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) is unfounded. Although attorney fees were 
awarded by the trial court, this Court expressly refused to address the issue on appeal 
since the issue was not properly preserved at the trial court level. Tolman at 460-461. 
Appellees think it is important to note some of the reasoning exhibited by the trial 
court in deciding that attorney fees were not available under the third-party negligence 
theory. As the trial court stated: 
"...this court should not extend existing law, which is what Macris asks, to 
apply that [the third-party] exception in a case arising out of a statute, 
especially where the legislature did not provide an attorney's fee remedy in 
that statute... 
...The third party litigation exception, which has been applied in tort and 
contract actions, cannot be read by the court to broaden an existing statute 
and provide a recovery neither contemplated nor intended by the 
legislature." (R. 739). 
Similarly, this Court has previously decided that the award of attorney fees is not 
permitted under the Utah fraudulent transfer statute. The reasoning of the trial court 
mirrors the reasoning of this Court in so ruling, and in conjunction with the statutory 
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language, defeats Appellant's mis-application of the third-party negligence exception and 
necessarily bars Appellant's pursuit of attorney fees where the bases of the underlying 
claim are moot. Therefore, this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court in that 
attorney fees are not available as a claim for damages under the Utah fraudulent transfer 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is prohibited from pursuing further contract damages in Macris II and 
there is no statutory, case law or contractual authority permitting recovery of attorney fees 
and punitive damages in this case. Similarly, Appellant's arguments seeking to extend 
the recovery of attorney fees and punitive damages to this case are barred by this Court's 
prior decision and not warranted. Accordingly, Appellee respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the trial court's ruling of summary judgment in favor of Appellees. 
Dated: May 13,2002 c — — - ~ » "-> 
Scott T.Temby (#8081) 
Christopher S. Crump (#7839) 
Wade S.Winegar (#5561) 
Bruce R. Murdock (#6948) 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES this 13th day of May, 2002 
to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
*v 
Scott T. Temby 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES this 13th day of May, 2002 to the 
following: 
M. David Eckersley 
Prince, Yeates and Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott T. Temby 
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This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act* 1988 
25-6*2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate* means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other 
than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre-
tionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person 
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the 
debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business 
under a lease or other agreement or controls substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset* means property of a debtor, but does not 
include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a 
valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt 
under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by 
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim* means a right to payment, whether or not 
the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor* means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt* means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor* means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider* includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general 
partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(aXii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a 
director, officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, 
officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general 
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is 
a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(c)(iiij; 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which 
the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(d)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, 
manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the 
affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an 
obligation, and includes a security interest created by 
agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable 
process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory 
lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited 
liability company, corporation, association, organization, 
government or governmental subdivision or agency, busi-
ness trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial 
entity. K. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the sub-
ject of ownership. , 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an to^™"*; 
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within tne 
third degree as determined by the common law, ora^ 
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive reia*~| 
tionship within the third degree. . ,. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indii 
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or i n v o l u n t f ! J ^ i 
disposing of or parting with an asset or an h***6 8 '"^S f 
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, w*^ 
creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
 t , ~ (13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective 5»f^5|i 
the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained DV ^ Jg* 
or equitable process or proceedings. 
25-6-3. Insolvency; ] 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is 
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they 
become due is presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the 
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, 
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the 
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's 
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership 
debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that 
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred 
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to 
the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor 
not included as an asset. 1988 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred 
or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value 
does not include an unperformed promise made other than in 
the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish 
support to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a 
person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person 
acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a 
regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution 
of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the 
interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of 
trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange 
between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to 
be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contempora-
neous. 1988 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or 
after transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose 
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the 
obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a busi-
ness or a transaction for which the remaining assets 
of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to 
the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably 
should have believed that he would incur, debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), 
consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or con-
cealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was 
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with 
suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's 
assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the 
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after 
a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor. 1988 
25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before 
transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obli-
gation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became 
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the 
transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the 
debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reason-
able cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 1989 
25-6-7. Transfer — When made. 
In this chapter: 
(1) A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property 
other than a fixture, but including the interest of a 
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the 
asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a 
good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor 
against whom applicable law permits the transfer to 
be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset 
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real prop-
erty or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far 
perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot 
acquire a judicial lien other than under this chapter 
that is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be per-
fected as provided in Subsection (1) and the transfer is not 
so perfected before the commencement of an action for 
relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made 
immediately before the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be 
perfected as provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is 
made when it becomes effective between the debtor and 
the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired 
rights in the asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the 
parties; or 
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing 
executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the 
benefit of the obligee. 1988 
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation 
under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in 
Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against 
the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in 
accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the 
debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset trans- ' 
ferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the 
asset transferred or of other property of the trans-
feree; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may re-
quire. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against 
the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution 
on the asset transferred or its proceeds. 1988 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-5(l)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a 
reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent trans-
feree or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the 
extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under 
Subsection 25-6-8(l)(a), the creditor may recover judgment for 
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsec-
tion (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered j 
against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for 
whose benefit the transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith 
transferee who took for value or from any subsequent 
transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the • 
value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an ; 
amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the 
transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obliga-
tion under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is 
entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the 
transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset 
transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the 
judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb) 
or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
la; termination 01 a lease upuu uciauiv uy mc ucuwr 
when the termination is pursuant to the lease and appli-
cable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance 
with Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform Commercial Code — 
Secured Transactions. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the 
benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless 
the new value was secured by a valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or finan-
cial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabili-
tate the debtor and the transfer secured present value 
given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the 
debtor. 2000 
25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent 
transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished 
unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or 
obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered 
by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1), within 
four years after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred; or 
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. 
1988 
25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and 
equity, including merchant law and the law relating to prhv 
cipal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insol-
vency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement 
this chapter's provisions. 1988 
25-6-12. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of this chapter among states enacting it. 1988 
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter. 
This act applies when any transfer occurs after the effective 
date of this act. 1988 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive 
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general 
damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or inten-
tionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disre-
gard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and stan-
dards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any 
claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's 
operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated 
or under the influence of any drug or combination of 
alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 
78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is not subject to the prior 
award of compensatory or general damages under Sub-
section (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to 
the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under 
Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall 
be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive 
damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded 
and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess 
of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be 
remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into the General 
Fund. 1991 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEWAYS, INC, et al., 
Defendants. 
! CASE NUMBER: 950400093 
DATED: JULY 18,2001 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Having heard the arguments and reviewed the memoranda of counsel, I now issue 
this ruling granting the motion. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
1. On April 17, 1991, Macris and Associates, Inc. (Macris), filed an 
action in this court against defendant Images and Attitude, Inc. (Images) claiming 
that Images breached its distributorship contract with Macris by improperly 
terminating Macris' auto-qualification status as a distributor and by improperly 
terminating the distributor agreement (this lawsuit is hereafter referred to as 
"Macris I"). 
2. Macris I went to trial in February 1995 and a judgment in favor of 
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Macris and against Images was rendered on September 15, 1995, in the principal 
sum of $360,681.20. 
3. On or about September 1, 1992, and while Macris I was pending. 
Images purportedly sold its assets and multi-level marketing business, including 
down line organization, to Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), a newly formed Utah 
Corporation. 
4. Neways, was formed by Thomas E. Mower and Leslie D. Mower, 
the principals of Images. 
5. Neways allegedly sold the same product line as Images had done, 
but with the products relabeled as Neways products, and allowed Images 
distributors to apply for and receive the same distributor status in Neways as they 
had enjoyed in Images. 
6. Because of the termination of its distributorship contract, Macris 
was not allowed to apply for or receive distributorship status in Neways. 
7. On February 14, 1995, two days before the Macris I trial, Macris 
filed this lawsuit against Neways, Thomas E. Mower, and Leslie D. Mower (this 
lawsuit is hereafter referred to as "Macris II"), under legal theories of fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability, and alter ego, asserting that the transfer of assets from 
Images to Neways had left Images without sufficient assets to cover any judgment 
rendered against it in Macris I. 
8. On October 19, 1995, defendants in Macris II moved for summary 
judgment, contending that the Macris claims were barred by res judicata. 
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9. Macris countered that its claims against Nevvays arose after the 
initiation of Macris /, and that res judicata did not apply. 
10. Macris also moved for summary judgment, arguing that because 
Nevvays had admitted in its own motion that it was privy to Images for purposes of 
res judicata, Macris should be granted summary judgment on its successor liability 
claim. 
11. The trial court granted the Macris motion, holding that Nevvays was 
Images successor and therefore liable for the Macris /judgment. The trial court 
also held that res judicata did bar Macris from recovering further contract damages 
on its theories of alter ego, fraudulent conveyance or successor liability. 
12. Neways appealed the trial court's successor liability ruling and 
Macris cross-appealed the court's ruling that Macris was barred by res judicata 
from recovering further contract damages. 
13. The court of appeals reversed both summary judgments. 
14. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to Neways, and on 
December 5, 2000, affirmed the court of appeals, holding that Macris's claims of 
alter ego, fraudulent conveyance and successor liability were not barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata, but further ruling that the issue preclusion branch of the 
doctrine of res judicata precluded Macris from seeking further contract damages 
from Neways in Macris II 
15. Subsequent to the Supreme Court ruling, Macris filed a demand for 
payment against Images. In response, a third corporation owned by principals 
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Thomas and Leslie Mower, Nevada corporation Neways International, Inc., paid 
the Maoris I judgment in full, including accrued interest. 
16. Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that with the 
judgment from Maoris I paid, and because Macris is barred from seeking any 
further contract damages, the claims in Macris II all are moot, that there is no 
remaining issue as to any material fact, and that they are entitled to judgment of 
dismissal as a matter of law. Defendants further move for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Macris, contending that the continued maintenance of Maoris II by Macris, 
including its opposition to the motion for summary judgment, is for purposes of 
harassment and to needlessly increase litigation costs. 
Analysis & Ruling 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate when the movant makes a showing 
which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the respondent. 
FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co.. 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
Macris concedes that there is no dispute as to the material facts asserted by 
defendants in their moving papers. Thus, defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment if they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Framed another 
way, the question may be asked whether, given the factual scenario asserted by 
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defendants and conceded by Macris, defendants are entitled to relief as a matter of 
law. 
The starting point for defendants* analysis is that the Supreme Court has 
ruled in this case that no further contract damages are available to Macris other 
than the sums due under the Macris I judgment, a judgment which Macris concedes 
has been paid in full, principal and interest. Defendants thus assert that no further 
damages are available since the Macris /judgment has been satisfied, 
In response Macris raises two claims: that it retains a consequential damage 
claim under the theories of fraudulent transfer, alter ego or successor liability and 
that it is entitled to an award of punitive damages for the fraudulent transfer made 
by Mowers. It then describes the consequential damages which it seeks as the 
attorney's fees which it had to incur in attempting to recover the judgment which it 
was awarded in Macris 1} I will treat each of these issues. 
Consequential damages-attorney's fees. 
As a general rule, attorney's fees are not recoverable in a contract action 
unless provided by statute or by contract. Neither of these exist. 
Macris asserts that the third party litigation exception to the foregoing 
general rule applies in this case. That rule is best stated in South Sandpitch Co. v. 
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1988): 
1
 Macris asserts that its attorney fee claim is not inconsequential in amount, somewhere 
around $65,000. Such an attorney's fee claim is in an amount that deserves careful 
consideration. While defendants may question the amount of fees, I see no real dispute Macris 
had to incur significant fees to obtain payment of the Macris /judgment. In short, a judgment 
entered in 1995 was not paid until 2001, six years later. 
5 
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It is settled that when the natural consequences of one's negligence 
is another's involvement in a dispute with a third party, attorneys 
fees reasonably incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable 
from the negligent party. 
While South Sane/pitch is a tort action and this exception most often is 
applied in tort actions, this exception also has been applied in breach of contract 
actions, see Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 9S2(Utah 1992); and in claims for breach of 
a fiduciary duty, see To/man v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc.. 912 P.2d 457 
(Utah 1996). 
At first blush, then, it would seem that if the third party litigation exception 
applies in this case, which Macris claims it does, Macris should be entitled to 
recover its attorney's fees. It overlooks, however, the controlling issue: whether 
attorney's fees under the third party litigation exception are recoverable in a 
statutory action. 
1 accept the Macris analysis that the third party litigation exception may 
apply in contract actions and in tort claims. The existing case law described above 
controls. But here Macris seeks to apply the third party litigation exception to a 
case arising under statute-the fraudulent transfer action. What Macris asks the 
court to do is reach past the plain language of the statute and apply a remedy where 
the legislature did not do so. While use of the third party litigation exception may 
be appropriate in contract or tort actions, this court should not extend existing law, 
which is what Macris asks, to apply that exception in a case arising out of a statute, 
especially where the legislature did not provide an attorney's fee remedy in that 
statute. 
6 
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It is beyond dispute that the fraudulent transfer statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
25- 6-1, e/ seq., does not provide for recovery of attorney's fees as a remedy. Yet, 
the legislature clearly knows how to create an attorney's fee remedy when it wishes. 
One need only look at the mechanics lien statute, Utah Code Ami § 38-1-18. For 
whatever reason, the legislature chose not to include an attorney's fee provision in 
the fraudulent transfer statute. I decline to apply an exceptional remedy in a case 
where the legislature has not seen fit to impose just such a remedy. The third party 
litigation exception, which has been applied in tort and contract actions, cannot be 
read by the court to broaden an existing statute and provide a recovery neither 
contemplated nor intended by the legislature. 
Absent the broadening effect of the third party litigation exception, 
attorney's fees are not recoverable in this action. And with that, there are no 
compensatory damages which are available for Macris. Defendants are entitled to 
judgment dismissing the compensatory damage claim as a matter of law. 
Punitive damages. 
The second item of recovery which Macris seeks is punitive damages. 
Again, on its face it appears that the actions of defendants may rise to the level 
where an award of punitive damages would be appropriate. But I deny this remedy 
also. 
First, Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(1 )(a) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and 
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or 
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intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the 
rights of others. < 
Here there is no award of general or compensatory damages, as the only 
compensatory damage claim asserted by Macris-attorney's fees-has been denied. 
As a result, punitive damages are not available under this section. No other 
statutory basis for an award of punitive damages has been proffered. 
Second, Macris asserts that other jurisdictions allow punitive damages as an 
element of recovery in a fraudulent transfer action. While that may be, I again 
decline to find a remedy in a statute which the legislature did not see fit to include. 
On its face the fraudulent transfer does not provide for recovery of punitive 
damages.2 I decline to extend that statute and create a remedy where the legislature 
chose not to. The punitive damage claim must be dismissed. 
Successor liability and alter ego theories. 
The Macris complaint also alleges claims for relief under successor liability 
and alter ego. Yet, it is clear that these two theories are asserted as a means of 
recovering the breach of contract damages owed by Images to Macris under the 
Macris /judgment. That judgment has been satisfied, though, and no further 
remedy exists. Further, since these theories are intended as a vehicle for Macris to 
2
 I find it interesting that the legislature created a fraudulent transfer cause of action with 
out creating a punitive damage remedy. The gist of a fraudulent transfer action is that the 
transferor took an action, generally in bad faith or with a malicious intent, to defeat the legitimate 
claims of a creditor or other person having a claim against the transferor. Where actual intent to 
hinder or delay collection of a debt or an intent to significantly undercapitalize a business must be 
proven, the issue of bad faith is obvious. Yet the legislature chose not to create a punitive 
damage remedy. This court should lightly tread where the legislature has chosen not to act. 
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recover breach of contract damages, the Supreme Court's holding that no further 
breach of contract damages are available precludes any recovery under these legal 
theories. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing these 
claims. 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. Pursuant to Rule 4-
504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendants' counsel is directed to 
prepare an appropriate order. 
\t 
Dated this ]_}_ day of July, 2001. 
9 
*J ) • 
( J O 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 18th day of July, 2001: 
Bruce Murdock 
150 East 400 North 
Salem, Utah 84653 
David Eckersley 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CARMA BUSH 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By. X)vTAfltt4/LdJ41 
Dfeputy Clerk 
79: O 
10 
